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DIVORCE FOR TEMPERAMENTAL INCOMPATIBILITY

Lester B. Orfield*
not acquainted with American or Continental legal history
might conclude that temperamental incompatibility as a ground
for divorce is a novel and radical innovation. In fact, such divorces
have been possible from the beginning of our history. Legislatures
granted divorces until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 'We
are told that the legislature was appealed to in cases that were too
flimsy or too whimsical for the courts."1
About a century ago and for more than a generation later at least
nine states had "omnibus clauses in their divorce statutes broad
enough to include incompatibility of temper."2 No such statutes with
respect to absolute divorce survive today. The Connecticut clause, in
effect from 1849 to 1878, was associated with a period in which the
Connecticut divorce rate was much higher than the rate in other
states.3
An early Illinois statute provided that "in addition to the causes
herein before provided for divorces from the bonds of matrimony,
courts of chancery in this State shall have full power and authority to
hear and determine all causes for a divorce not provided for by any
law of this State."4 But the statute was narrowly construed so as to
include only common law, canon law and statutory grounds. Hence
divorce for even permanent insanity was refused. 5 Obviously divorce
for incompatibility would not be permitted.6
An early Iowa statute provided for divorce, if it is fully apparent
to the court that the spouses cannot "live in peace and happiness together and that their welfare requires a separation." 7 The Iowa court
stressed that it was not enough that the parties could not live peaceably
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• Professor of Law, Indiana University.
Foreword to "A Symposium in the Law of Divorce," 28 IowA L. REv. 179
at 187 (1943). Lack of positive legislation on the grounds for divorce was a contributing
factor to legislative divorce. Squire, "The Shift from AdveISary to Administrative Divorce,"
33 Bosl'. UNIV. L. RBv. 141 at 150 (1953).
2 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 65 (1932). Arizona, Connecticut, Florida,
Washington and Wisconsin are listed in SnMsON, AMERICAN STAl'tll'E I.Aw §6213 (1886).
Utah also had such a clause, adopted in 1852. Squire, "The Shift from Adversary to
Administrative Divorce," 33 Bosl'. UNIV. L. RBv. 141 at 152 (1953).
3 Llewellyn, "Behind the Law of Divorce: II," 33 CoL. L. RBv. 249 at 253 (1933).
4 ill. Rev. Stat. (1845) c. 23, §8.
5 Hamaker v. Hamaker, 18 ill. 137 (1856); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 66 ill. 87 (1872).
6 See Bartlow v. Bartlow, ll4 ill. App. 604 (1904).
7 Jowa Code of 1851, §1482(8). For the history of this statute see Kingsley, "Cruelty
as a Ground for Divorce in Iowa," 14 IowA L. RBv. 266 at 267 (1929); note, 28 IowA L.
RBv. 341 at 347-348 (1943).
1 Pound,

660

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 52

and happily together; their welfare must require a separation.8 The
term "welfare" meant more than pecuniary welfare. It meant also the
moral, social and mental well-being of the parties, and the well-being
of the children. The permanent peace and happiness must be involved.
Normally the plaintiff must not be at fault. But in some cases both
parties might be at fault. "There may be such positive incompatibility
of temper, as to render it entirely impossible for them to live together in
peace and happiness." 9 The parties must have endeavored to overcome
the incompatibility. The statute making incompatibility a ground of
absolute divorce was repealed in 1855 except as to pending cases,10 and
it was entirely repealed in 1858.11
In 18 55 · the Minnesota divorce law was amended to provide for
divorce: 'When it shall be made fully to appear that from any other
reason or causes existing, the parties cannot live in peace and happiness together, and that their welfare requires a separation."12 This
statute was repealed in 1866. A Minnesota judge has stated that it was
enacted "to meet a particular case."13 Limited divorce may still be
granted in Minnesota for incompatibility.14
A Washington statute effective until 1921 provided that "a divorce
may be granted upon application of either party for any other cause
deemed by the court sufficient, and the court shall be satisfied that the
parties can no longer live together."15 Presumably many divorces were
granted for incompatibility. Nevertheless several appellate decisions
held that the mere fact that the parties felt that they could no longer
live together or refused to live together was not sufficient ground for
divorce. 16 Thus while the statute seemed broad enough to include incompatibility, the appellate court did not accept it as a ground.17 The
1921 statute expressly enumerated the grounds for divorce, but the
s Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa 204 at 212 (1857).
9 Id. at 215.
.
10 Iowa Laws (1854) c. 76, p. 112.
11 Iowa Laws (1858) c. 64, p. 97.
12 Minn. Laws (1855) c. 17, §4(7). As to the history of this statute see Kingsley,
"Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in Minnesota," 16 MINN. L. RBv. 256-257 (1932).
13True v. True, 6 Minn. 458 at 464 (1861).
14 Widstrand v. Widstrand, 87 Minn. 136 at 138, 91 N.W. 432 (1902).
15 Wash. Rem. Code (1915) §982. The Washington omnibus clause goes back to
1860. Llewellyn, ''Behind the Law of Divorce: II," 33 CoL. L. RBv. 249 at 258 (1933).
16 McDougall v. McDougall, 5 Wash. 802, 32 P. 749 (1893) (complaint alleged
cruelty); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 38 Wash. 491, 80 P. 762 (1905) (complaint alleged
cruelty); Bickford v. Bickford, 57 Wash. 639, 107 P. 837 (1910) (complaint alleged
indignities). But in Freeburn v. Freeburn, 107 Wash. 646, rni P. 620 (1919), the defendant obtained a divorce for incompatibility. His complaint charged incompatibility, cruelty
and indignities. The Supreme Court affirmed and stressed the fact of incompatibility.
17 28 CoL. L. RBv. 505 at 506, n. 3 (1928).
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former provision with respect to the court's being satisfied that the
parties could no longer live together was omitted; and it was further
provided that divorce should be granted on the application of the "injured" party.18 In 1928 Department One of the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a plaintiff was not an "injured" party simply because the defendant was temperamentally incompatible through a mental derangement, hence a decree of the lower court granting a divorce
was reversed.19 In the same year Department Two of the Supreme
Court affirmed a divorce and placed emphasis upon the incompatibility
arising out of differences in taste and age. 20 Subsequent decisions made
it clear that the statutory grounds are exclusive.21
In one state divorce has been granted for incompatibility without
statutory authority.22 In an Arkansas case the parties had been married
for about thirty years and had three children. The eldest child could
not get along with his father and fought with him constantly. After
several unsuccessful attempts to live with his wife peacefully, the
husband left the marital home permanently. The wife brought an
action for maintenance and support on the ground of desertion. The
husband £led a cross-bill for absolute divorce. His allegations of cruelty
and indignities were not proved. The trial court dismissed the wife's
petition and granted the husband a separation from bed and board. On
appeal by the husband the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that he
was entitled to an absolute divorce. 23 Recent Arkansas decisions appear
to indicate that incompatibility is not a ground and that the statutory
grounds are exclusive.24
The prior discussion has involved incompatibility as a ground for
absolute divorce. One might surmise that it might be a more frequent
18 Wash. Rev. Code (1952) §26.08.020.
19 Shaw v. Shaw, 148 Wash. 622, 269 P. 804 (1928) (complaint alleged cruelty and
personal indignities).
20 Haller v. Haller, 149 Wash. 277, 270 P. 822 (1928) (complaint alleged cruelty).
These two cases are commented on in a note, 4 WASH. L. REv. 83 (1929), which rejects
the view that incompatibility is a ground for divorce in Washington. The latter case is
cited in a case involving incompatibility. Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214 at 221, 114 P. (2d)
91 (1941).
21 Fix v. Fix, 33 Wash. (2d) 229, 204 P. (2d) 1066 (1949).
22 For the present Arkansas statute as to grounds for divorce see 2 Ark. Stat. Ann.
(1947) §34-1202.
23 Clyburn v. Clyburn, 175 Ark. 330, 299 S.W. 38 (1927), noted 28 CoL. L. REv.
505 (1928), and 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 66 (1932). While the court found
both parties to blame, the wife was found to blame in a greater degree. The disharmony
arose largely because of unwarranted suspicion by the wife of her husband's fidelity. The
husband was required to pay alimony. The case is cited in a leading New Mexico decision
on incompatibility. Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214 at 221, 114 P. (2d) 91 (1941).
24Disheroon v. Disheroon, 211 Ark. 519 at 524, 201 S.W. (2d) 17 (1947) (complaint alleged cruel and intolerable treatment).
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ground for limited divorce. Yet this seems not to be the case.25 Kentucky26 and Rhode Island27 have long had omnibus clauses making it
a ground for limited divorce. The Minnesota statute has been construed as permitting limited divorce. 28 In jurisdictions in which cruelty
is a ground for judicial separation the courts have made it clear that
_incompatibility alone does not constitute cruelty.29
What have been the developments in the twentieth century? A
distinguished federal judge has pointed out that the ''Virgin Islands
was the first American jurisdiction to adopt incompatibility as a ground
for divorce."30 The Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Croix,
enacted by the Colonial Council of the Municipality in 1920, so provided.31 The Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Thomas and
St. John, enacted by the Colonial Council of the Municipality in 1921,
also so provided.32 These provisions were carried over into the law
enacted by the Legislative Assembly in 1944.33 The first and only
American state, New Mexico, made such provision in 1933.34 Alaska
followed in 1935.35
25 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws

245, 373, 378 (1932).
Rev. Stat. (1948) §403.050. ''Divorce from bed and board may be rendered
for any cause that allows divorce, or for any other cause that the court in its discretion
considers sufficient."
27 R.I. Gen. Laws of 1938, c. 416, §8. "Divorce from bed, board and future cohabitation, until the parties be reconciled, may be granted for any of the causes for which by law
a divorce from the bond of marriage may be decreed, and for such other causes as may
seem to require the same: Provided, the petitioner shall be a domiciled inhabitant of this
state and shall have resided in this state such length of time as to the court in its discretion
shall seem to warrant the exercise of the powers in this section conferred."
2s Widstrand v. Widstrand, 87 Minn. 136, 91 N.W. 432 (1902); Kingsley, "Cruelty
as a Ground for Divorce in Minnesota,'' 16 MINN. L. REv. 256 at 266 (1932).
29 Berg v. Berg, 289 N.Y. 513, 46 N.E. (2d) 910 (1943); Marx, "Psychosomatics and
Judicial Separations," 20 FORDHAM L. REv. 84 at 85 (1951).
30 Maris, J.; in Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 805.
3l Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Croix, title III, c. 44, §7, subdivision eight
(1920).
3 2 Code of Laws of the Municipality of St. Thomas and St. John, title III, c. 44, §7,
subdivision eight (1921).
33 Divorce Law of Virgin Islands, Bill No. 14, §1 et seq. Sec. 7 provides: "A legal
separation or the dissolution of the marriage contract may be declared at the instance of the
injured party for any of the following causes: . . . (8) Incompatibility of temperament."
34N.M. Laws (1933) c. 54, p. 71, 2 N.M. Stat. (1941) §25-701: "The several district courts within and for the state of New Mexico are hereby vested with full power and
authority to decree divorces from the bonds of matrimony for any of the following causes: .•.
8. Incompatibility." It has been surmised that the law was adopted because of the inadequacy of legal separation and qualified divorce from bed and board. Poteet v. Poteet, 45
N.M. 214 at 219, 114 P. (2d) 91 at 92-93 (1941).
35 Session Laws of Alaska, 1935, c. 54, p. 120; 3 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949)
§56-5-7: ''For what causes marriage contracts may be dissolved..•• Fifth. Cruel and inhuman treatment calculated to impair health or endanger life or personal indignities rendering life burdensome or incompatibility of temperament." There have been no cases construing the statute. Note, 5 ARK. L. REv. 419 at 421 (1951). The statute was applied
in Green v. Green, (D.C. Alaska 1953) 113 F. Supp. 697.
2 6 Ky.
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From what source did the Virgin Islands receive the ground of Incompatibility? The Codes of 1920 and 1921 were modelled on the
Alaska Code of Civil Procedure. But they added a ground of divorce
not contained in the Alaska Code, namely, incompatibility of temperament.36 Under the Danish law which was in force at the time of
the adoption of the Codes in 1920 and 1921 divorce upon grounds
"analogous to incompatibility of temperament had been recognized."37
In Denmark after 1770 divorces granted by the King3 8 became more
numerous and were given on new grounds. In some cases they were
given though the defendant was not at fault as where he suffered from
insanity or leprosy. In some cases they were given for "irremediable
disharmony in the common life."39 In fact from 1790 many divorces
were granted without there· being any distinct legal grounds, notably
when the parties had separated but also when there had been no separation. By a Danish law of March 23, 1827, applicable to the Danish
West-Indies, a royal consent divorce might be given by the authorities
when the spouses after a separation agreement had lived separately for
three years and spiritual and temporal mediation had failed and both
wished a dissolution of the marriage and were agreed upon the terms
of the divorce. 40
How has incompatibility been defined in the jurisdictions which
now make incompatibility a ground of absolute divorce? Justice Hudspeth of the Supreme Court of New Mexico offers the following definition of incompatibility. " 'Incompatibility' is defined by the Century
Dictionary as: 'The quality or condition of being incompatible; incongruity; irreconcilableness.' And Webster's New International Dictionary: 'Quality or state of being incompatible; inconsistency; . . .
incapable of harmonious combination; incongruous; as, incompatible
colors; incapable of harmonious association or acting in accord; dis36 Burch v.

Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 805-806.
at 805. See "Marriage and Divorce in Denmark," 110 Tm, NATIONS 563
(1920); Hankins, 5 ENCY. Soc. SCIENCES 177, 180 (1931).
The existing Danish law provides judicial separation for deep and permanent disharmony (dyb og varig Uoverensstemmelse). Where there has been a separation in fact
because of disharmony for at least four years a divorce may be granted. DANMARKs LoVE
1665-1949. "Lov om Aegteskabs Indgaaelse og Opl¢sning," c. 6, §§52, 53 (112), 54, 55,
p. 626 (1950).
38 "The institution of executive divorce by the sovereign .•. was the starting point for
the practice of divorce by administrative agencies as it presently exists in Denmark, Iceland,
and Norway." Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries," 18
LAw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 3 at 11 (1953).
39 VIGGO BENTZON, FAMILIERBITBN 155 (Copenhagen, 1924). At the request of
Judge Maris the author of this article supplied the Danish authorities and translations
thereof cited in Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 805, 808.
40 VIGGO BENTZON, DEN DANSKE FAMILIBRBT 245-246 (Copenhagen, 1910).
3 71d.
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agreeing; as incompatible persons .... ' Pope's Legal Definitions gives
the following: 'Incompatibility. The elements and qualities which may
create incompatibility between persons elude exact definition, so varied
are the circumstances and so dependent is such a state of feeling upon
education, habits of thought and peculiarities of character. It must be
assumed that the parties understood the wide signification of the word
and used it understandingly (in a contract for employment that could
be annulled for "dishonesty, incapacity, incompatibility or breach of
the agreement") . . . The word is not a word of art, or of technical
or local meaning, or having two distinct meanings, circumstances which
have been held to justify parol evidence of the meaning of a word
used in a written contract. (Greenl. Ev. § 295.) The largeness of the
meaning of the term . . . is no reason for limiting its interpretation,
nor does it furnish any reason for permitting parol evidence in ex• ' "41
p Ianat:Ion.
Justice Bickley of the Supreme Court of New Mexico concludes
that there is incompatibility "when the court is satisfied that the parties
can no longer live together."42 It "may result from causes amounting
to statutory grounds for divorce as well as from causes not mentioned
as being grounds for divorce." The same judge stated later, speaking
for the entire court: "We decline appellant's invitation to give an exact
definition of incompatibility."43 He thought that irreconcilableness is an
important factor. Permanent separation is "strong evidence" of incompatibility, but the court does not say "that in all cases a permanent
separation must necessarily precede action for divorce on the ground
of incompatibility."
The latest definition is by Judge Albert B. Maris of the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. After referring favorably to the definitions in the New Mexico decisions, he stated: 'We conclude that
while incompatibility of temperament in the Virgin Islands Divorce
Law does not refer to those petty quarrels and minor bickerings which
are but the evidence of that fraility which all humanity is heir to, it
unquestionably does refer to conflicts in personalities and dispositions
so deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for the parties
4 1 Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480 at 486, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935). A leading authority has proposed confining it "to the situation where the parties find themselves unable to
live together happily after a bona fide effort extending over a reasonable time." 2 VERNIER,
.AMEmcAN FAMILY LAws 65 (1932). For a discussion from the viewpoint of social psychology see Kelly, "Marital Compatibility as Related to Personality Traits of Husbands and
Wives as Rated by Self and Spouse," 13 J. Soc. PsYcH. 193 (1941).
42 Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480 at 493, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935). The italics are
those of the court.
43 Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214 at 222, 114 P. (2d) 91 (1941).
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to continue a normal marital relationship with each other. To use the
ancient Danish phrase, the disharmony of the spouses in their common
life must be so deep and intense as to be irremediable. It is the legal
recognition of the proposition long established in the earlier Danish
law of the Islands that if the parties are so mismated that their marriage has in fact ended as the result of their hopeless disagreement
and discord the courts should be empowered to terminate it as a matter of law."44
As in other divorce cases the domicile of at least one of the spouses
must be within a state or territory in order to give the courts of that
state or territory power to grant a divorce.45 The Virgin Islands Divorce
Law requires that the plaintiff must be an "inhabitant" of the Virgin
Islands at the time of the commencement of the action and for six
weeks prior thereto, which "residence" shall be sufficient to give the
court jurisdiction.46 The word "inhabitant" has been construed as
meaning "domiciliary" and the word "residence" as meaning "domicile."47 In New Mexico the plaintiff "must have been an actual resident in good faith, of the state for one year next preceding the £ling
of his or her complaint."48 But a wife suing may take advantage of
such period of residence by her husband. In Alaska the plaintiff "must
be an inhabitant of the Territory at the commencement of the action
and for two years prior thereto, which residence shall be sufficient to
give the court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose."49 Residence means
domicile.50 It must be obvious that the Virgin Islands will attract
more parties seeking a divorce in jurisdictions other than the matrimonial situs.51
44 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 806-807.
45 Id. at 804. As to the conflict of laws aspects, see Calloway, "Legal Status of the
Virgin Islands Divorces," 3 Dmrn B.J. 102 (1953). A 1953 amendment to the Virgin
Islands law providing that continued presence in the jurisdiction for six weeks prior to
filing "shall be prima facie evidence of domicile," was found invalid in Alton v. Alton, (3d
Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 667, criticized in 22 GEo. WAs:a:. L. fu.v. 356 (1954) and 67
HARv. L. fu.v. 516 (1954), cert. granted 347 U.S. 911, 74 S.Ct. 478 (1954).
46 Sec. 9.
47 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 804-805. In this case the
plaintiff came to the Virgin Islands about July 1, 1950 in order to work and commenced
his divorce action on August 31, 1950.
482 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §25-704.
49 3 Alaska Comp. Stat. Ann. (1949) §56-5-10.
50 Wilson v. Wilson, IO Alaska 616 (1945). An officer of the United States Army
suing for divorce on the ground of incompatibility was refused divorce on the ground that
a permanent domicile on a military reservation was not possible.
51 The annual rate of divorces in the past five years is 250. The average for the period
1950-1955 is likely to be 500. This seems not excessive in comparison with nearly 9,000
in Nevada and 18,000 in Florida in 1950. The NEw YoRK TIMES, May 10, 1953, p. 55.
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If the defendant spouse could plead the defense of recrimination,
obviously the utility of incompatibility as a ground for divorce would
be greatly impaired. Under the Virgin Island statute divorce for
incompatibility may be obtained "at the instance of the injured
party...."52 Does this mean not only one who is injured by the defendant' s incompatibility but also one who is innocent of any conduct which would afford the defendant a ground for divorce? The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held not. It properly
pointed out that "in the case of at least two of the grounds for divorce
recognized by the statute, impotency existing at the time of the marriage and insanity occurring after marriage, there can be no question
of either innocence or guilt."53 In these cases the injured party has
lost a normal marital relationship because of the physical or mental
disability of the other. In the case at hand he has been injured by incompatibility of temperament. And he is injured even though he himself participates in the incompatibility. Incompatibility "necessarily involves both parties," in the view of Judge Maris.54 Rare would be the
spouse so saintly as to overlook the feeling of incompatibility of the
other spouse, or so insensitive as not to be aware of it and indifferent
to it.55 The statutes of New Mexico and Alaska do not in express terms
require that the divorce be obtained at the instance of the injured party.
The New Mexico Supreme Court seems to have rejected a contention
by the appellant that "divorces should only be granted on the application of the party 'injured.' "56
The principle of recrimination should not be and has on several
occasions been held not applicable when incompatibility is the ground
for divorce.57 Almost a century ago when incompatibility was a ground
in Iowa, recrimination was held not an absolute bar.58 At a time when
incompatibility was a ground in Washington, recrimination was re52 Sec.

7.

Such a statute is said indirectly to make recrimination a defense. Note, 26

CoL. L. REv. 83 at 84 (1926). For a recent comprehensive discussion of recrimination, see
41

CALIF. L.
53 Burch

REv. 320 (1953).
v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 807.
5 4 Id. at 808. The ground of incompatibility "is a recognition of the fact that in many
cases both spouses are to blame." Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480 at 487, 50 P. (2d) 264
(1935).
55 The wish of one spouse to continue the marriage despite the incompatibility will
not preclude a divorce. Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480 at 487, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935).
56 Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214 at 217, 114 P. (2d) 91 (1941). See also Inskeep v.
Inskeep, 4 Iowa 204 at 214-216 (1857).
57 Where separation for a specified number of years is a ground for divorce, there have
been decisions ignoring the fault of the applicant. Note 26 CoL. L. REv. 83 at 87 (1926);
H.Am>.sn, PnoBL.BMS OF THE FAMILY 700 at 702 (1952). The same is true as to "indignities." Note, 1 WYO. L.J. 187 at 190 (1947).
58 Inskeep v. Inskeep, 5 Iowa 204 at 214-216 (1857).
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jected.59 The Texas court seems in effect to have applied the theory
of recrimination to a spouse alleging cruelty tantamount to incompatI·b·l·ty
I I •60
Of more immediate concern is the construction of the statutes now
in force expressly making incompatibility a ground for divorce. There
are no decisions concerning the Alaskan statute.61 But both the New
Mexico and Virgin Islands statutes have been construed. In the :6.rst
New Mexico decision the majority opinion stated that adultery "is
generally available as a recriminatory charge in all cases."62 Two
judges rejected the doctrine of recrimination. 63 In the next case the
court assumed that the trial court found rightly against the defendant
on the issue of recrimination and stated that it "need not now decide
whether recrimination is a defense in a divorce action where the sole
ground alleged is incompatibility."64 Finally in 1946 the court decided that recrimination was not a bar even though the husband
allegedly committed adultery after the separation occurred. 65 In 1950
the court modi:6.ed its position. 66 It held that incompatibility itself
might not be pleaded as a defense to a divorce action based on incompatibility. But as to other cases of traditional recrimination, the trial
court in its discretion might deny divorce. In the particular case the
plaintiff's acts of adultery both before and after separation might be
treated by the trial court as barring a divorce sought for incompatibility.
Two judges dissented on the ground that the doctrine of recrimination
had been previously completely rejected. On the other hand two of the
judges wished expressly to overrule the prior case completely rejecting
recrimination. Thus the concept of fault continues to exist in New
Mexico though in an attenuated fashion.
119 Schirmer v. Schirmer, 84 Wash. 1, 145 P. 981 (1915) (plaintiff alleged cruelty
.and adultery; defendant alleged cruelty, divorce granted to both parties).
But shortly after the doctrine was restored. McMillan v. McMillan, 113 Wash. 250,
193 P. 673 (1920). See note, 26 CoL. L. REv. 83 at 87 (1926).
60 Mansur v. Mansur, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 37 S.W. (2d) 846. Incompatibility is
:not a ground for divorce in Texas.
61 The only ground of recrimination mentioned in the Alaskan Code is adultery. 3
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §56-5-11.
62 Chavez v. Chavez, 39 N.M. 480 at 482, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935). Hence a divorce
sought on the ground of desertion was denied. Thus on its facts the decision is not a
holding as to incompatibility.
63 Hudspeth, J., 39 N.M. 480 at 484, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935); and Bickley, J., 39
N.M. 480 at 488, 50 P. (2d) 264 (1935).
64 Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214 at 222, 114 P. (2d) 91 (1941).
05 Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174 P. (2d) 826 (1946). Sadler, C.J., dissented. The case is noted 36 KY. L.J. 342 (1948); 31 MrnN. L. REv. 744 (1947); 18
Miss. L.J. 471 (1947); 33 VA. L. REv. 355 (1947).
66 Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P. (2d) 147 (1950). Two new judges participated and Sadler, J., who dissented in 1946, wrote the opinion.
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The most recent decision involving recrimination as a possible bar
to divorce for incompatibility is an interpretation of the Virgin Islands
statute. 67 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
agreed with the New Mexico decision68 that the incompatibility of
temperament of the plaintiff would not operate as a defense by way
of recrimination. The court looked to the Danish background of the
Virgin Islands law and found that the only ground of recrimination
was adultery,69 and the legislature intended this to be the exclusive
ground. 70 The cruelty of the plaintiff is therefore not a bar to divorce
on the ground of incompatibility.71
A doctrine of comparative rectitude72 would be less harsh than one
of recrimination. Such a doctrine was seemingly applied by the District Court of the Virgin Islands. But on appeal this approach was
rejected, the court stating: "Obviously, it could not apply to a case of
incompatibility of temperament and in any event the Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands did not prescribe it in the Divorce Law of
1944."73
While recrimination is not an absolute bar to a divorce for incompatibility and while the doctrine of comparative rectitude does not
apply either, nevertheless evidence of misconduct of the plaintiff can
be considered along with other evidence in determining whether the
best interests of the parties would be served by granting a divorce. 74
The Virgin Islands law provides that the court may dissolve a marriage
contract for the causes enumerated.75 The New Mexico law vests the
courts with "full power and authority to decree divorces" for the causes
enumerated, but does not in terms require them to grant divorces. 76
The Alaska statute states that marriage contracts may be dissolved for
67 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 808-811.
6 8 Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364 at 367, 225 P. (2d) 147 (1950).
69VIGGO BENT.ZON, DEN DANSKE FAMILIERET 217-218 (Copenhagen, 1910). Recrimination is not a bar in Scotland, and is greatly restricted in England. Note, 26 CoL. L.
REv. 83 at 88 (1926). The same is true as to the German statute of 1938. Silving, "Divorce without Fault," 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 551-556 (1944). The same is true in
Poland. Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and after Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice," 2 INT. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72 at 77 (1953).
70 Sec. 10. This section was taken from the Alaskan Code. Adultery is the only
ground of recrimination mentioned in the Alaskan Code. 3 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann.
(1949) §56-5-11.
11 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 810.
72 63 A.L.R. 1132 (1929); 14 MINN. L. REv. 94 (1929); 3 So. CAL. L. REv. 127
(1929); 159 A.L.R. 731 (1945); HARPER, PROBLEMS OP THE FAMILY 704 (1952).
73 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 810.
74 Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P. (2d) 147 (1950); Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir.
1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 810.
75Sec. 7.
1a2 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §25-701.

1954]

TEMPERAMENTAL INCOMPATIBILITY

669

the causes enumerated.77 The Swedish law appears to give some weight
to fault. 78 The same seems to be true of the present Danish statute
and the Norwegian statute.79 It is not clear whether the Swiss law
arrives at this result.80
Since recrimination is not an absolute bar to divorce for incompatibility, a divorce may be granted to both parties. In a case· where
the plaintiff obtained a divorce for incompatibility, the defendant was
also granted a divorce for cruelty.81
When a spquse obtains a divorce for incompatibility, he is not
necessarily relieved of the obligation to pay alimony. 82 Under the
Virgin Island law alimony may be recovered from only the "party
in fault." 83 This has been construed as meaning not only a party whose
overt acts constitute grounds for divorce, but also a party whose incompatible temperament has deprived the other party of the opportunity of enjoying a normal marital relationship.84 In this sense the
plaintiff is a party at fault, as is also the defendant.85 The Alaskan statute, which furnished the model for the Virgin Islands statute, has a similar provision concerning the "party in fault." 86 Presumably it is to be
construed in the same manner as ·the Virgin Islands statute. 87 The New
Mexico statute does not expressly require that only the party at fault
3 Alaska Comp. Stat. Ann. (1949) §56-5-7.
''Divorce without Fault," 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 556 (1944).
79 Szirmai, ''Divorce by Mutual Consent and after Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice," 2 IN-r. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72 at 76 (1953).
80 Silving, "Divorce without Fault," 29 lowA L. REv. 527 at 551-556 (1944).
81 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 810-811. Compare Schirmer
v. Schirmer, 84 Wash. 1, 145 P. 981 (1915), in which plaintiff alleged cruelty and adultery
and defendant alleged cruelty; 4 HASTINGS L.J. 197 at 201 (1953); 41 CALIF. L. REv.
320 at 329 (1953).
8 2 For the general rule see Vernier and Hurlbut, ''The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present Statutory Structure," 6 LAW AND CoNTBM. PROB. 197 at 202,
212 (1939); note, 28 KY. L.J. 233 (1939). See also note, 12 AusT. L.J. 11 (1938). Alimony has been allowed in cases of separation for a period of years. Note, 97 Umv. PA. L.
REv. 705 at 709 (1949).
Where there is temperamental incompatibility the SPOUSe obtaining alimony may have
to be satisfied with less than if she had been without fault. Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1953)
205 F. (2d) 115.
83 Sec. 12.
84 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 811.
8 5 For cases allowing alimony when both parties are at fault, note, 28 KY. L.J. 233
at 236 (1940). Favoring the elimination of fault, see Kelso, ''The Changing Social Setting
of Alimony Law," 6 LAw AND CoNTBM. PROB. 186 at 195 (1939). In Germany there may
be alimony though both parties are at fault, provided that the predominant fault rests with
one party. Mankiewicz, ''The German Law of Alimony before and under National Socialism," 6 LAw AND CoNTBM. PROB. 301 at 310-312 (1939).
86 3 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949) §56-5-13.
87 Olsen v. Olsen, 5 Alaska 459 (1916); Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d)
799 at 811.
77

78 Silving,
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pay alimony. 88 The Supreme Court of New Mexico has upheld a
decree ordering the plaintiff to pay alimony to his wife.89 When incompatibility was a ground for divorce in Washington, a husband
obtaining a divorce was required to turn over property to his wife. 90
An Arkansas decision required a husband obtaining a divorce to pay
alimony.91
In the jurisdictions maJcing incompatibility a ground for divorce the
husband may have alimony if the wife is the "party in fault" in
Alaska.92 There should be the same result in the Virgin Islands as
the statute is similar.93 In New Mexico alimony is available only to
the wife.94 In Germany a husband unable to support himself may have
alimony. 95 In Rhode Island and possibly in Kentucky, where limited
divorce is available for incompatibility, the husband may recover alimony.96
What about custody of children when divorce is granted for incompatibility? The general rule is that custody is not determined on
the basis of marital fault. 97 It is within the discretion of the court,
and the welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration.
Under the Virgin Islands law preference is given to the party not in
fault "unless otherwise manifestly improper."98 However it has been
held that both parties are at fault when incompatibility is involved. 99
In New Mexico the court may make such orders and decrees for the
custody of any minor child of the defendant "as shall deem necessary
or advisable."100
ss2 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §25-706.
89Poteet v. Poteet, 45 N.M. 214, 114 P. (2d) 91 (1941). Community property is
equally divided. Sands v. Sands, 48 N.M. 458, 152 P. (2d) 399 (1944). On the latter
problem see Daggett, "Division of Property upon Dissolution of Marriage," 6 LAw AND
CoNTEM. PROB. 225 (1939).
90 Freeburn v. Freeburn, 107 Wash. 646, 182 P. 620 (1919).
91 Clyburn v. Clyburn, 175 Ark. 330, 299 S.W. 38 (1927).
92 3 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §56-5-13, construed in Olsen v. Olsen, 5 Alaska 459
(1916).
93 Sec. 12, construed in Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 P. (2d) 799 at 811-812.
94 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1951 Cum. Supp.) §25-706.
95 Schoch, "Divorce Law and Practice under National Socialism in Germany," 28 IowA
L. REv. 225 at 251 (1943).
96 2 VERNIER, AMmucAN FAMILY LAws §133 (1932).
97 Note, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 99 at 108 (1947); Weinman, ''The Trial Judge Awards
Custody," 10 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 721 (1944).
98 Sec. 12. The Alaskan statute is similar. 3 Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. (1949)
§56-5-13.
99 Burch v. Burch, (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 799 at 811-812.
lOON.M. Stat. Ann. (1941) §25-714.
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The Continental Practice

The earliest of all modern divorce codes making incompatibility
a ground for divorce was the Prussian decree of King Frederick II
(the Great), issued in 1752.101 Divorce might be granted not only for
cause but also upon the basis of mutual agreement and for unilateral
"insuperable aversion." The Prussian General Code of 1794 took over
these provisions and they continued in effect until 1900.102 Maria
Theresa (1740-1780) and Joseph II (1780-1790) of Austria were impressed by the Prussian model, but confined it to non-Catholic Christians, permitting divorce for unilateral aversion provided that a judicial
separation had first been obtained; and to Jews who might obtain
divorce by mutual agreement.103 The Austrian law remained in effect
until Germany absorbed Austria in 1938. In Denmark after I 770
divorces were given for "irremediable disharmony in the common
life."104 Beginning in 1790 many divorces were given without there
being any distinct ground and even when the parties had not separated. The French law of 1792 permitted divorce upon mutual consent. One writer has concluded that it also allowed it on the claim
of one party that incompatibility existed.105 Another writer has denied
that the latter was permissible.106
In 1910 a report of the joint Norwegian-Danish-Swedish Commission recommended that divorce be granted at the parties' mutual request when there was "deep and constant discord."107 To make certain that such discord existed it was suggested that the :final decree be
preceded by separation for a year during which time reconciliation
should be attempted by a clergyman or some other person appointed
by the court. This recommendation was adopted by Sweden in 1910,
Denmark in 1915 and Norway in 1918. The Swedish law was
amended in 1920. The Danish law was amended in 1922.
The Swedish statute of June 11, 1920, now in force, permits
101 Rheinstein,

"Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries," 18

I.Aw AND CoNT.EM. PRoB. 3 at 5, 12 (1953).
102 Id. at 14-15.
103 Id. at 12-13.
104 The Danish is as follows: "ubodelig Uvilje til Samliv (odium implacabile)." See
1 Vxcco BENI'ZON, FAMILIERE'ITEN 155 (Copenhagen, 1924).
105 Jacob, "Problems of Divorce in France Incident to the Statutes of 1941," 28 IowA
L. REv. 298 (1943).
106 Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law in Western Countries," 18 I.Aw
AND CoNT.EM. PRoB. 3 at 13 (1953).
107 Note, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 99 at 109 (1947); Hankins, "Divorce,'' 5 ENCY. Soc.
SCIENCES 177, 180 (1931). As to the Danish Law see "Marriage and Divorce in Denmark,''
110 THE NATIONS 563 (1920). See also ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF ScANDINAVIAN I.Aw
50, 291-292 (1953).
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divorce for "deep and lasting discord."108 One spouse may secure a
separation on that ground, and, after a year of separation, either spouse
may obtain an absolute divorce. If there is no decree of separation,
either may receive a divorce after living apart for three years. The
other Scandinavian states allow divorce by mutual consent, though
they do not always speak in express terms about temperamental mcompatibility as does the Swedish law. 109
108 SVERIGES Rnrns LAG. "Giftermalsbalk," c. 11, p. 24 (1951) provides: "2. If due
to a difference in temperament and ideas or to other reasons, a deep and lasting discord has
arisen between the spouses, and if one of them desires separation, he shall be entitled to it
unless, with regard to his own conduct or other special circumstances it can be reasonably
required that he continue the relationship.
"3. If the spouses, after having secured separation, have lived apart for a year and
their marital relationship is not resumed, a decree of divorce can be issued upon the petition
of either spouse.
"4. If husband and wife, without decree of separation, on account of discord, have
lived apart for three years, either may receive a divorce. If only one of them desires it and,
on account of his conduct or other special circumstances, it is found that the marriage law
should not be dissolved upon his petition, a decree shall not be granted."
This is the translation of Professor Sellin, as quoted in Silving, "Divorce without
Fault," 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 556 (1944). For a di£ferent translation see Rheinstein,
"Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries," 18 I.Aw AND CoNTEM.
PROB. 3 at 5, n. 7 (1953). For a discussion of the Swedish experience see Bjorkman,
"Sweden's Solution of Divorce,'' 76 T:e:a FoRUM 543 (1926); Segerstedt and Weintraub,
"Marriage and Divorce in Sweden,'' 272 ANNALS OF THE AMER. ACAD. OF PoL. AND Soc.
Ser. 185 at 189-194 (November 1950).
1o9 Rheinstein summarized the law as follows in ''Trends in Marriage and Divorce
Laws of Western Countries,'' 18 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 3 at 5, n. 7 (1953):
In Denmark there is divorce by administrative decree after separation for a year and six
months. DANMARKs LovE 1665-1949, ''Lov om Aegteskabs Indgaaelse og Opl¢sning,''
c. 6, §§52, 53 ('112), 54, p. 626 (1950). In Finland there is divorce after two years of
separation in fact. Marriage Law of June 13, 1929, part III, c. 1, §76. The Icelandic law
is similar. Law of June 28, 1921, §51 et seq. The Norwegian law is similar, and divorce is
by administrative decree. Law of May 15, 1918, Concerning Marriage and Divorce, c. 5,
§§41, 43.
With respect to divorce by mutual consent, which is closely connected with divorce
for incompatibility the law has been summarized as follows by Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual
Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental Practice,'' 2 hrr. AND CoMP. L.Q.,
part 1, 72 at 73 (1953). Under the Danish law of June 30, 1922, on mutual request a
separation order is made. After one year and a half of judicial separation, divorce is granted
on mutual request of the spouses. If the judicial separation lasts for two and one-half years,
divorce can be granted on the request of one of the spouses. Divorce cannot be granted
before the question of the mutual liability of the spouses to maintain one another and of
the care of the children has been settled by agreement. Divorce is granted by royal decree,
but in fact the spouses are entitled to divorce. In Norway, under the law of May 15, 1918,
as amended on June 19, 1931, on mutual request a separation order is made. After one
year of judicial separation, divorce is granted on mutual request of the parties. If the
judicial separation lasts for two years divorce can be granted on the request of one of the
spouses. As in Denmark, divorce is granted by royal decree. In Sweden, under the law of
June 11, 1920, the rule as to judicial separation is similar to the Norwegian. But the
Swedish statute refers to a "deep and permanent rift which renders living together intolerable." Proof of the rift is not made a condition of judicial separation, which is granted on
joint request of the spouses.
With respect to divorce on the ground of protracted separation, which is also closely
connected with divorce for incompatibility, the law has been summarized by Szirmai, id. at
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Under the Swiss law of 1907 divorce may be obtained for incompatibility.110 The Swiss law is based on breakdown and not on consent or separation.111 The law of Czechoslovakia of May 22, 1919
permitted divorce by reason of "invincible aversion, if alleged by both
spouses."112 The Czech code of 1949 continues this ground.113
The new Civil Code which became effective in Germany in 1900
abolished divorce upon mutual agreement and upon the ground of unilateral insuperable aversion. However divorce was still permissible for
''blameworthy conduct rendering married life unbearable to the other
partner."114 Hence in actual practice the old law was not changed
very much.115 The German law of 1938 allowed divorce after three
years separation for "a deep incurable destruction of the marital relatJ.•on. "116
The Yugoslav statute of April 3, 1946 follows the Swiss pattem,1 17
as does the Polish law of 1950.118 Uruguay is one of the few Latin
American countries to allow divorce for incompatibility.119 In effect
incompatibility is a ground in Russia since divorce is in the discretion
75-76. Since no judicial separation order is obtained, a longer period of living apart is
required. Under Danish law it is four years. Under Norwegian and Swedish law it is three
years. Under Danish and Swedish. law it is a right of the parties. Under Norwegian law
it appears to be within the discretion of the King. Under Danish law the right cannot be
enforced if it was mainly the plaintiff's behavior which led to the separation and in addition
the defendant objects. Under Swedish law the right cannot be enforced if only one of the
spouses wishes the divorce, and having regard to the behavior of the plaintiff or to other
circumstances, there are good reasons for not granting divorce.
llO Article 142 of the Swiss Civil Code provides: "If so deep a destruction of the
marital relationship has occurred that continuance thereof cannot fairly be expected from
the spouses either spouse may sue for a divorce.
"If the deep destruction can overwhelmingly be ascribed to one, the other only of the
couple can sue for divorce."
111 Silving, "Divorce without Fault," 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 545-548 (1944);
Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental Practice," 2 Tun-. AND CoMP. L.Q., part l, 72 at 77 (1953).
112 Silving, "Divorce without Fault,'' 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 546, n. 79 (1944). The
Swiss Code was influential.
113Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice,'' 2 Tun-. AND CoMP. L.Q., part l, 72-78 (1953).
114 Sec. 1568.
115 Rheinstein, ''Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries,'' 18
LAw AND CoNTEM. PnoB. 3 at 14-15 (1953).
116 Silving, ''Divorce without Fault,'' 29 IowA L. REv. 527 at 551 (1944). See also
Schoch, "Divorce Law and Practice under National Socialism in Germany," 28 IowA L.
REv. 225 at 245-251 (1943).
117 Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and after Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice,'' 2 Tun-. AND CoMP. L.Q., part l, 72-75 (1953).
118 Id. at 77.
119 Elliott, ''Divorce Legislation and Family Stability,'' 272 ArmALs 134 at 138 (November 1950).
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of the court. The two reasons most frequently cited are adultery and
"a patent inability to live together."120
Other Alternatives
When considering the desirability of adding incompatibility to the
list of grounds for divorce, it seems well to ask whether or not it is included in existing grounds. To what extent, if any, is incompatibility
different from mental cruelty?121 Cruelty is a ground for divorce in 42
states.122 It is not a ground in Alabama, the District of Columbia, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina. and Virginia. Eight
states mention the mental element in their general designations of
cruelty or include it in a formal definition.123 These statutes sometimes describe a state of mind virtually identical with incompatibility.124 Four other states speak of cruelty through personal violence
"or any other means."125 Similar provisions in other states grant relief
from treatment of such nature "as to render their living together insupportable";126 "as to injure health or endanger reason";127 or "as to
indicate a settled aversion . . . or to destroy permanently . . . peace
or happiness."128 The statutes of seventeen states are silent as to the
mental factor. 129 Of this group only Illinois has consistently adhered
to the view that mental distress is not enough.130 The only state stat120 Id. at 137.
121It is regarded as the best alternative in note, 9 DtJXE B.A.J. 49 at 52 (1941).
A layman might think them the same. An article on divorce in the Virgin Islands for
incompatibility asserts that it "corresponds to 'mental cruelty' in the states." NEW Yorut
TIMES, May 10, 1953, p. 55.
122Note, 5 Arut. L. REv. 419 at 420 (1951).
123 California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota and
Utah. Note, 5 Arut. L. REv. 419 at 420 (1951).
·
124Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) §21-106. "Extreme cruelty is ••• the infliction of
grievous mental suffering upon the other by one party to the marriage, by a course of
conduct towards or treatment of one party to the marriage by the other • • • which justly
and reasonably is of such a nature and character so as to destroy the peace of mind and
happiness of the injured party, or entirely to defeat the proper and legitimate objects of
marriage, or to render the continuance of the married relation between the parties perpetually unreasonable or intolerable to the injured party."
125 Arizona, Michigan, Nebraska and WisconsiI?,. See note, 5 Arut. L. REv. 419 at 421
(1951).
126 La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1945) §138(3); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon,
1951) art. 4629(1).
121 2 N.H. Rev. Laws (1942) c. 339, §6(V).
12s Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) §403.020(4)(d).
120 Connecticut, Delaware, illinois, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Note, 5 Arut. L. REv. 419 at 421 (1951). But the courts give general approval to
this ground in only seven of these states: Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, and Oklahoma. Id. at 423-424. In New Mexico the court was readier to find
mental cruelty a ground because the statute also makes incompatibility a ground. Holloman
v. Holloman, 49 N.M. 288, 162 P. (2d) 782 (1945).
1soBiair v. Blair, 341 ill. App. 93, 93 N.E. (2d) 95 (1951).
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utes unequivocally precluding mental cruelty as a cause for divorce
are those of Alabama and South Carolina.131 Thus, on the whole,
mental cruelty is a recognized ground as interpreted by the courts in
about two-thirds of the states.132 Yet surely there is a considerable gap
in American law when in one third of the states neither mental cruelty
nor incompatibility is a ground for divorce.
Close scrutiny of the decisions reveal that mental cruelty may have
considerable less scope than incompatibility. A leading writer has concluded that perhaps the weight of authority requires an intentional
injury for mental cruelty.133 The fact of sharp political or religious
differences might well result in incompatibility and yet not constitute
mental cruelty.134 Overt acts of misconduct are necessary for mental
cruelty.135 Concealed aversion may be present in incompatibility; unconcealed aversion is mental cruelty.136 Decisions on mental cruelty
often insist on injury to the health of the plaintiff.137 Recrimination
may be a bar when mental cruelty is the ground for divorce.138
One may also ask whether divorce for "indignities" is not a valid
181 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 34, §22; S.C. Const., art. XVII, §3.
132 These jurisdictions are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The law is in doubt in Kentucky and New Hampshire.
No kind of cruelty is a ground in Alabama, District of Columbia, Maryland, New
York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. In the following states the courts look
with disfavor on the ground: Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See note, 5 Amt. L. REv. 419 (1951).
133 MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE I.Aw oF PERSONS AND DoMEsTic RELATIONS 275
(1931). See also Kingsley, "Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce in Minnesota," 16 MINN. L.
REv. 256 at 267-269 (1932); Weinstein, "Mental Cruelty as Grounds for Divorce," 17
MARQ. L. REv. 101 at 105 (1933). But cf. note, 5 Amt. L. REv. 419 at 424 (1951).
The English view does not seem to require a deliberate intention to be cruel. Rosen,
"Cruelty in Matrimonial Causes," 12 MoD. L. REv. 324 at 342 (1949).
The Georgia statute, Ga. Laws (1946) pp. 90, 91, Ga. Code Ann. §30-102(10),
defines cruelty as "the willful infliction of pain, bodily ·or mental, upon the complaining
party, such as reasonably justifies apprehension of danger to life, limb, or health." But this
statute is liberally construed in Hinkle v. Hinkle, (Ga. 1953) 74 S.E. (2d) 657 at 659,
noted 39 A.B.A.J. 502 (1953).
As to cruelty by an insane defendant see HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 707708 (1952). In Swan v. Swan, [1953] 3 West. L.R. 591, noted, 69 L.Q. Rev. 439
(1953), a divorce for cruelty was denied when the husband was suffering from such disease
of the mind that he did not know the nature and quality of his acts or that he was doing
wrong. Swan v. Swan is also noted in 17 MoD. L. REv. 76 (1954).
134 Note, 2 DUKE B.J. 134 (1952).
135 Note, 9 DuKE B.A.J. 49 at 53 (1941).
1sssabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395, 166 P. 624 at 625 (1917).
137 MADDEN, HANDBOOK oF THE LAw oF PERSONS AND DoMEsTic IlELATioNs 274
(1931). But see note, 5 Amt. L. REv. 419 at 426 (1951).
1382 VERNIER, AMEmcAN FAMILY LAws §78 (1932); recent case, 17 MINN. L. REv.
663 (1933); HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 703 (1952). But cf. De Burgh v.
DeBurgh, (Cal. 1952) 250 P. (2d) 598, noted 4 HAsnNGs L.J. 197 (1953).
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substitute. Only ten jurisdictions make this a ground.139 The statutes
have been construed as requiring a course of conduct evidencing intentional and deliberate neglect, estrangement and settled hatred.140
The concept of indignities, because of its usual requirement of intentionality, does not overlap with incompatibility to the same extent as
mental cruelty since in many states the latter concept does not require
intentional conduct. In some states recrimination may be a bar.141
Another possible alternative is divorce on the ground of protracted
separation. Sixteen American jurisdictions make this a ground.142
There is similar provision in the laws of Norway,1 43 Sweden, Denmark, Hungary, Germany, Austria and Poland.144 English law does
not so provide and the English bar is opposed.145 Since the period
ranges from two to five years except in Rhode Island and Texas where
it is ten years, the delay may make this ground an inadequate one.
There may also be difficulties with respect to recrimination146 and alimony147 and as to the meaning of "separation."148
Another alternative is divorce by mutual consent.149 Roman law
permitted such divorce.160 The French Civil Code of 1804, repealed
139 This is a ground for absolute divorce in Arkansas, Alaska, Hawaii, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Washington and Wyoming. It is a ground for limited
divorce in North Carolina. Notes, 1 WYO. L.J. 187 (1947); 5 Aro.. L. REv. 419 at 421
(1951). Alaska allows divorce for both indignities and incompatibility. New Mexico and
the Virgin Islands allow it for only the latter.
140 Notes, 1 WYo. L.J. 187 at 190 (1947); 5 ARK. L. REv. 419 at 425 (1951). In
Sabot v. Sabot, 97 Wash. 395 at 395, 166 P. 624 (1917), the court stated: "Indifference
is an 'indignity' and unconcealed aversion is a 'cruelty' within the meaning and intent of
the statute. They are more relined but no less substantial than words or blows or neglect."
141 1 WYO. L.J. 187 at 190 (1947).
142 Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Nevada,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. In four states, Minnesota, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia, divorce is
possible if a judicial separation is not followed by reconciliation. Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv.
99 at 101-104 (1947); 97 Umv. PA. L. REv. 705 (1949).
143 As to the Scandinavian states see note 109 supra.
144 Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice,'' 2 hrr. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72 at 75-77 (1953).
145 Wels, "Causes and Cures of Divorce-an Inquiry," NEw Yoru. TIMEs, Magazine
Section, March 8, 1953, pp. 13, 35-36.
146 Notes, 26 CoL. L. REv. 83 at 87 (1926); 35 CALIF. L. REv. 99 at 101 (1947);
97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 705 at 706 (1949).
147Notes, 35 CALIF. L. REv. 99 at 107-108 (1947); 97 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 705 at
709 (1949).
148 97 UNIV.

PA. L. REv. 705 at 710 (1949).
149 Notes, 20 CoL. L. REv. 472 at 474 (1920); 36 CoL. L. REv. 1121 at 1132 (1936).
See "Legalize Divorce by Mutual Consent? Pro and Con," 34 READERS DIGEST 91-96
(January 1939).
150 Yankwich, "Aspects of Roman Civil Law,'' 26 So. CAL. L. REv. 292 at 304 (1953);
Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and Divorce Laws of Western Countries,'' 18 LAw AND
CoNTEM. PRoB. 3 at 6-7 (1953).
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in 1816, so provided.151 The laws of several Continental states so
provide: Belgium, Rumania, Holland, Norway,1 52 Sweden, Denmark,
Hungary and Yugoslavia.153 In effect it is a ground in Russia.154
Mexican law makes mutual consent an express ground, but a year must
have elapsed after the celebration of the marriage.155
One way to make incompatibility a ground for divorce is to make
divorce a matter of judicial discretion and abolish specific grounds of
divorce.156 In 1938 Germany seemed to be moving in this direction,
but it was felt that the time was not yet ripe.157 At that date Russia
provided for divorces based on the single general divorce ground of
destruction of the marital relation.158 The present Russian law permits
divorce "if the court ... deems it necessary to dissolve the marriage."
This permits the court to select the grounds including mutual consent.159 A Hungarian statute of 1952 is to similar effect.160

Conclusion
A British Royal Commission has recently taken testimony as to
problems of marriage, divorce and family life. The Marriage Law Reform Society proposed that "there should be some general ground for
divorce which should subsume all, or almost all, other grounds and give
151 Rheinstein,

"Trends in Marriage and Divorce Laws of Western Countries," 18
CoNTEM. PROB. 3 at 5-6, 13 (1953).
152 As to the Scandinavian states see note 109 supra. In Sweden the statute makes
express reference to incompatibility.
153 As to the Continental states see Szirmai, ''Divorce by Mutual Consent and After
Protracted Separation: Continental Practice," 2 INT. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72-75 (1953).
154 Id. at 78.
155 Summers, "The Divorce Laws of Mexico," 2 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 310 at
317-318 (1935).
156 "The second legislative project should be a declaration that divorce is no longer a
matter of individual right, but purely of judicial discretion to be granted in the light of all
the circumstances of the case. The statute should do away with all specific causes of
divorce and announce that each case must stand on its own merits, the question for judicial
determination being: is the family any longer a useful, living, sociological entirety, or
capable of rehabilitation?" Bradway, "The Myth of the Innocent Spouse," 11 TuLANB L.
Rav. 377 at 393 (1937). See also HARPER, PROBLEMS OF nm FAMILY 774-775 (1952).
157 Silving, ''Divorce without Fault," 29 IowA L. RBv. 527 at 533-534 (1944).
158 Id. at 533-534, 539-540, 548-556. See also Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and
Divorce Laws of Western Countries," 18 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 3 at 16-17 (1953).
159 Szirmai, ''Divorce by Mutual Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental Practice," 2 INT. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72-78 (1953). See also Berman, "Soviet
Family Law in the Light of Russian History and Marxist Theory," 56 YALE L.J. 26 (1946);
Gsovski, "Marriage and Divorce in Soviet Law," 35 GBo. L.J. 209 (1947); Sverdlov,
"Modem Soviet Divorce Practice," 11 MoD. L. Rav. 163 (1948); Wolff, "Some Aspects of
Marriage and Divorce Laws in Soviet Russia," 12 MoD. L. Rav. 290 (1949); note, ''Le
Mariage et le divorce d'apres la legislation actuelle de l'U.S.S.R." 2 RBvuB hmmNATION•
ALB DB DRoIT CoMPARB 347 (1950).
160 Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and After Protracted Separation: Continental
Practice," 2 INT. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72 at 74 (1953).
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a court a general jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage where, in fact it
has come to an end.... The proposal we are discussing would be to permit in any case where deadly hatred or unconquerable aversion or incompatability of temperament exists between the parties. . . . Incompatibility appears to us to be the sensible ground. . . . The introduction of this ground would enable all other existing grounds for divorce
to be abolished except insanity. . . . The specific grounds for divorce
are rarely in themselves the cause of the break-up. A man who leaves
his wife or treats her cruelly generally does so as the result of tension
and disharmony, arising from the spouses' personalities."161 The organized bar strongly opposed: "To introduce a basis whereby marriage
may be dissolved by agreement or at the will of one spouse would, we
believe, strike a disastrous blow at family life. It would basically alter
the attitude of mind toward marriage, not merely of those who are
married but of those who are contemplating marriage."162
Possibly the American jurisdictions are no readier than England to
add incompatibility to the list of grounds for divorce. Sociologists may
favor, but religion, sentiment, logic and historical accident are likely to
play important roles as they have in the past.163 Incompatibility is not
included in the grounds for divorce listed in a draft prepared by the
Interprofessional Commission on Marriage and Divorce Law, established by the American Bar Association.164
Nevertheless the American legislatures have moved in the direction
of making incompatibility a ground. It is already the law of the Virgin
Islands, New Mexico and Alaska. In two thirds of the jurisdictions
mental cruelty is a ground. In seventeen jurisdictions protracted separation is a ground. In ten indignities is a ground. Many states have
recently made insanity a ground, thus ignoring the element of fault. 165
As a practical matter incompatibility is often the true ground, as divorces are contested in only ten to fifteen percent of the cases. "The
courts have thus come to tolerate collusive practices through which con161 Weis, "Causes and Cures of Divorce-An Inquiry," NEw Yonx: TIMES, Magazine
Section, March 8, 1953, p. 13.
162 Id. at 35.
163 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 65-66 (1932); Fly, C.J., stated in Mansur
v. Mansur, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 37 S.W. (2d) 846 at 847: ''We hear men and women
and complacent judges, urging severing of the marriage ties and destruction of homes
because couples are not as happy as they might he, hut there is no law, human or divine
outside of communistic Russia, that sanctions divorces on such grounds."
The Protestant conception of Christianity would not seem clearly to stand in the way
of divorce for incompatibility. FosDICK, THE MAN FROM NAZARETH 112-115, 186 (Pocket
Book ed. 1953). Compare CADoux, THE LIFE OF JEsus 77, 143-144 (Pelican Books 1948).
164 Comment, 22 TENN. L. REv. 913 at 914 (1953).
165 In 27 states the statutes expressly make insanity a ground. HARPER, PROBLEMS oF
THE FAMILY 390-392 (1952).
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sent divorces can be easily obtained in spite of their reprobation by
the official law."166 Honesty and candor would seem to require that
the statutes be rewritten to accord with what actually happens. This,
and not easy divorce, is the real argument for making incompatibility
a ground for divorce. A higher divorce rate need not result. 167 The
divorce rate in the United States is three times as high as in Sweden
where incompatibility is a ground.168
Since incompatibility is proposed to make divorces honest rather
than easy, some or all of the following safeguards should be included.100 The incompatibility must be shown to be permanent and
not simply the temporary incompatibility which may develop in virtually
any marriage. The incompatibility must be deep-seated. That is to
say, the spouses must feel that the incompatibility is irremediable, and
possibly the judge must conclude that the causes alleged for incompatibility could reasonably produce incompatibility.170 Possibly the applicant for divorce should be required to make an affirmative showing that
he or she has tried to make the marriage succeed, and the divorce
granted only to the party who had tried the harder.171 A certain element of delay may be necessary to prevent hasty and unjustified
divorces.1 72 For example, divorce for incompatibility should not be pos166 Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries," 18
LAw .AND CoNTEM. PROB. 3 at 19 (1953). See also Llewellyn, ''Behind the Law of
Divorce: II," 33 CoL. L. R:Ev. 249 at 284-285 (1933); note, 36 CoL. L. R:Ev. 1121 (1936).
The same seems to be true in England. "Where both parties to a marriage want a
divorce they can always get one, though very occasionally they have to make more than one
attempt." Harvey, "On the State of the Divorce Market," 16 Mon. L. REv. 129 at 134
(1953).
167 ''The only perceptible result of changes in legal grounds is the redistribution of
divorces on the basis of available grounds, without any effect upon their number. This is
attested by the fact that there is not the slightest connection between the number of
grounds in the several states and their respective divorce rates." Lichtenberger, "Divorce
Legislation," 160 ANNALs 116 (1932), reprinted in SELECTED EssAYs ON FAMILY LAw
862, 865 (1950). Compare Elliott, "Divorce Legislation and Family Instability," 272
.ANNALS 134 at 139-140 (November 1950).
168 Segerstedt and Weintraub, "Marriage and Divorce in Sweden," 272 ANNALS 185
(November 1950). But the Swedish rate is increasing and incompatibility is the ground
alleged in almost 90 percent of all cases.
100 Sir James MacDonnell in advocating divorce by mutual consent suggested the
following prerequisites: consent long persevered in, minimum age, no hope of reconciliation,
safeguard of the interests of children, and a period of separation. 1 M:munls oF EVIDENCE
BEFORE THE RoYAL COMMISSION ON MATRIMONIAL CAusEs §408 (1912). See also
DeBurgh v. DeBurgh, (Cal. 1952) 250 P. (2d) 598 at 606.
170 Purely hedonistic reasons should be excluded. To that extent moral principles are
relevant. Neuner, "Modern Divorce Law-The Compromise Solution," 28 IowA L. REv.
272 at 283-285 (1943). The English cases on cruelty indicate that the individual reaction
must be taken into account. Rosen, "Cruelty in Matrimonial Causes," 12 Mon. L. REv.
324 at 339-341 (1949).
171 Sayre, "Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce," 18 LAw .AND
CoNTEM. PRoB. 26 at 28-31 (1953).
172 Llewellyn, "The Law Behind Divorce: II," 33 CoL. L. REv. 249 at 280-281 (1933).
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sible immediately following the marriage. Perhaps the law might require
that the parties must have been married for at least one year before they
can apply for divorce solely on the ground of incompatibility.173 Possibly, as in the Scandinavian states, before absolute divorce is granted
there should be a judicial separation or a protracted separation in fact
of the parties. Mediation through a public official might be made a
prerequisite as in Sweden.174 While recrimination should not be a bar,
nevertheless a remnant of discretion should be retained by the court
as to certain cases where the applicant is overwhelmingly at fault and
the other spouse is relatively innocent, or where children are involved.
Since in the usual case of incompatibility both parties are at fault to
some degree, alimony might still be decreed to the spouse defending
the action. Finally, divorce procedure should become less adversary
and more administrative in character.175
178 This seems to be the minimum period as to divorce by mutual consent in the
Continental states. Szirmai, "Divorce by Mutual Consent and after Protracted Separation:
Continental Practice," 2 !Nr. AND CoMP. L.Q., part 1, 72-75 (1953). The English law
imposes a time barrier. "Under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 a marriage cannot
normally be dissolved until it has lasted for three years." Harvey, "On the State of the
Divorce Market," 16 MoD. L. Irnv. 129 at 129 (1953).
174 Segerstedt and Weintraub, "Marriage and Divorce in Sweden," 272 ANNALS 185,
189-190 (November 1950). See also IiA:aPER, PROBLEMS OF nm FAMILY 773-775 (1952).
175 Alexander, ''Let's Get the Embattled Spouses out of the Trenches,'' 18 LAw AND
CoNTEM. PROB. 98 (1953); Squire, "The Shift from Adversary to Administrative Divorce,"
33 Bos-r. UNIV. L. Irnv. 141 (1953). Divorce in Denmark, Iceland and Norway is by
administrative decree. Rheinstein, "Trends of Marriage and Divorce Law of Western
Countries," 18 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 3 at 5, n. 7, 11 (1953).

